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Abstract. The dining cryptographers protocol implements a multiple
access channel in which senders and recipients are anonymous. A prob-
lem is that a malicious participant can disrupt communication by delib-
erately creating collisions. We propose a computationally secure dining
cryptographers protocol with collision resolution that achieves a maxi-
mum stable throughput of 0.924 messages per round and which allows
to easily detect disruptors.
1 Introduction
Protocols for untraceable communication have received much attention recently
as they can help us protect our privacy and avoid cyber espionage. The aim
of these protocols is not to encrypt messages but to prevent an attacker from
determining who is communicating with whom.
The dining cryptographers protocol [3] is the most secure protocol for un-
traceable communication known in computer science. This multi-party protocol
implements a multiple access channel in which senders and recipients of messages
remain anonymous. Unlike other primitives like mixes [4] and onion routing [9,7],
it does not require a trusted third party and it is not vulnerable to network based
attacks like traffic shaping.
The problem is that messages collide when multiple senders attempt to trans-
mit a message at the same time. Even worse, malicious participants can disrupt
the communication by deliberately creating collisions all the time. Such disrup-
tors are hard to identify because the anonymity of the honest senders must be
preserved.
Recent computationally secure variants of the dining cryptographers pro-
tocol use an anonymous reservation phase in order to avoid collisions and a
technique based on zero-knowledge proofs to detect disruptors [8,6,5]. However,
the implementation of such an anonymous reservation phase is complicated and
reservations do not adapt well to situations where participants are frequently
joining or leaving the group.
The present paper shows that one can address collisions as they occur us-
ing a collision resolution algorithm and still prevent disruption by a malicious
participant. First, we show that with a modified SICTA collision resolution al-
gorithm a maximum stable throughput (MST) of 0.924 packets per round can
be achieved for the dining cryptographers protocol. Then, we show that it is
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possible to use zero-knowledge proofs to verify that each participant properly
executes the collision resolution algorithm.
Compared to existing techniques our approach is easier to implement as there
is no a reservation phase. Further, it adapts better to situation where participants
are joining and leaving. We see possible applications in the fields of electronic
voting and low latency anonymous communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries
and definitions. In section 3, we discuss collision resolution with SICTA. In sec-
tion 4 we show how disruptors can be detected. In section 5 we discuss related
work, in section 6 we present possible applications, and we conclude in section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the principle behind the dining cryptographers
protocol and a technique to implement it efficiently.
Dining Cryptographers
In one round of the dining cryptographers protocol [3], every participant broad-
casts a ciphertext (O), which may or may not contain a message (M). (To keep
the description simple, we assume that the participants have reliable broadcast
channels at their disposal.) The encryption vanishes when the ciphertexts of all
participants are combined (e.g., C :=
∏
iO
(i)). If exactly one ciphertext con-
tains a message, then this message appears (e.g., C = M). However, there is a
collision when several ciphertexts contain a message (e.g., C = M ·M ′ ·M ′′).
We assume that messages are encoded with a checksum, so that it is possible to
distinguish between a message and a collision of messages.
Generation of Ciphertexts
We generate ciphertexts as described by Golle and Juels in [10]. The advantage of
this technique, which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, is that after
a single setup phase the participants can generate ciphertexts for a large number
of rounds. To this effect, participants share finite groups H = 〈h〉 and G = 〈g〉
and a bilinear map e : H × H → G such that e(ha, hb) = e(h, h)ab = gab for
a, b ∈ Z. The Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem is assumed to
be hard in H and G. Each participant has a private key x and the corresponding
public keys y¯ = hx and y = gx are known to all participants.
In a round j of the protocol, each participant then generates a ciphertext
Oj ∈ G which has an algebraic structure. This means that Oj is either of the
form
Oj = Aj
x
or of the form
Oj = Aj
xM,
wherein x ∈ Z is a secret key and M ∈ G is a message. As we have the BDDH
assumption, one cannot distinguish whether Oj contains a message M or not.
The value Aj is public and it is based on the public keys y¯ = hx of the other
participants and on a public random value Rj which is different in every round.
For example, n participants P (1), ..., P (n) compute
A
(i)
j = e
(
i−1∏
k=1
y¯(k)
n∏
k=i+1
1/y¯(k), Rj
)
,
The so obtained values A(i)j are different in each round and have the property
that they cancel when they are multiplied. I.e.,
n∏
k=1
(
A
(k)
j
)x(k)
= 1.
Therefore, only messages remain when a recipient multiplies the ciphertexts
O
(1)
j ...O
(n)
j provided by all the participants.
3 Collision Resolution with SICTA
In this section we explain the SICTA algorithm (Successive Inference Cancella-
tion Tree Algorithm) [14] and show that in the context of the dining cryptogra-
phers protocol we can reach throughput to 0.924 messages per round.
Collision Resolution
Assume in a round j each participant provides a ciphertext Oj . If several of these
ciphertexts contain a message, the combination of all these ciphertexts Cj :=∏n
i=1O
(i)
j only provides a multiplication of all the messages and no meaningful
information is transmitted. The purpose of a collision resolution algorithm is to
resolve such a collision by resending the involved messages in later rounds.
SICTA is a binary tree algorithm, in which a collision of messages is repeat-
edly split until all messages have been transmitted. When there is a collision in
one round, two subsequent rounds are dedicated to the resolution of this col-
lision. Each message involved involved in the collision is then retransmitted at
random in one of two dedicated rounds. This process is repeated recursively un-
til all collisions are resolved. An example of a SICTA collision resolution tree is
shown in Figure 3.1. To simplify the description we adapt our notation to binary
trees; when a collision that occurs in round j we assume that the rounds 2j and
2j + 1 are dedicated for the resolution. SICTA uses a technique called inference
cancellation to reduce the number of transmissions. As we have Cj = C2j ·C2j+1,
it is not necessary to transfer any O2j+1 for round 2j+1. The value C2j+1 can be
inferred from Cj and C2j by computing C2j+1 = Cj/C2j . For this inference can-
cellation to work, the algorithm operates in blocked access mode, which means
that no new message may be sent until all collisions are resolved.
M1M2M3M4M5
M2M4
M2
M4
M1M3M5
M3
M1M5
M1
M5
Cjround id j
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Fig. 3.1. Exemplary binary collision resolution tree with successive inference cancel-
lation (SICTA). In rounds 1,2,4,6 and 14, ciphertexts Oj are transmitted, and Cj is
computed using these ciphertexts. In rounds 3,5,7 and 15, no data is transmitted and
Cj is computed using data from the parent and the sibling node.
Performance
Let us consider the maximum stable throughput (MST), which denotes the max-
imal input rate (messages/round) for which all messages have a finite delay.
Therefore we define Sk as the average number of rounds needed to resolve a
collision of k messages, and we consider the throughput k/Sk.
A collision of k messages is split into two collisions with i and k− i messages
with a probability
(
k
i
)
2−k. Thus we have
Sk =
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
2−k(Si + Sk−i).
With
(
k
i
)
=
(
k
k−i
)
this can be written as
Sk =
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
21−kSi
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Fig. 3.2. Performance of collision resolution with SICTA.
and after removing the recursion we obtain
Sk =
21−k
1− 21−k
k−1∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
Si.
As ’collisions’ with 0 or 1 messages take only 1 round, we have S0 = S1 = 1. The
throughput k/Sk for increasing values of k is shown in Figure 3.2. We observe
for SICTA the known MST of 0.693.
We can achieve a higher throughput by exploiting the fact that in the din-
ing cryptographers protocol all senders are also receivers. After a collision of
two messages, the two respective senders can recover each other’s message by
removing their own from the collision. They can then avoid a further collision
by using a rule that for instance only the numerically smaller message is resent.
This way, collisions of two messages are always resolved in two rounds. I.e., we
have S2 = 2, which leads to a MST of 0.924.
So we have just computed the possible throughput of the channel and seen
that efficient collision resolution is possible. We have done this under the as-
sumption that every participant is honest and that no disruption takes place.
This assumption is reasonable, as we show in the next section that disruptors can
easily be detected and eliminated from the group. Being exceptional events, dis-
ruptions have no impact on the asymptotic (number of rounds → ∞) behavior
of the channel.
4 Detecting Disruptors
In this section, we show that disruptors are easy to detect. We first present tech-
niques using zero-knowledge proofs to prove statements about the retransmission
of messages, and then we show how these techniques can be used to verify that
each participant correctly performs the SICTA algorithm.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs for the Retransmission of Messages
It was shown in [10] that the algebraic structure of the ciphertexts makes it
possible to prove statements about them using zero-knowledge proofs. Such a
zero-knowledge proof allows a prover to prove to a verifier that a given statement
holds, without giving the verifier any further information. I.e., the verifier cannot
compute anything that he could not have computed before. One can for instance
prove the equality of discrete logarithms to different bases, and logical ∧ (and)
and ∨ (or) combinations of such statements [1]. It is also possible to prove the
inequality of logarithm to different bases [2].
Existing zero-knowledge proofs used in dining cryptographers protocols con-
tain statements about individual ciphertexts. E.g., the statement
logA1(O1) = logg y
holds when ciphertext O1 is empty (i.e., O1 = Ax1). As a reminder, x is a secret
key of the participant and y = gx the corresponding public key.
To verify the correct execution of the SICTA collision resolution protocols
we use a new kind of statements, which hold when there is a relation between
two or more ciphertexts coming from the same participant. E.g., the statement
logA1/A2(O1/O2) = logg y
holds when both ciphertexts O1 and O2 encode the same message M (or when
both encode no message). It is thus possible to construct more complex state-
ments in order to verify the retransmission of a message.
Example 1. The ciphertext O2 either contains no message, or the same message
as O1, when the statement(
logA2/A1(O2/O1) = logg y
)
∨ (logA2(O2) = logg y)
holds.
Example 2. At most one ciphertext out of O2, ..., Ok contains the same message
as O1 (and the rest of O2, ..., Ok contain no message), when the statement(
logA2...Aj/A1(O2...Oj/O1) = logg y
)
∨
(
logAj (Oj) = logg y
)
holds for j ∈ {2, ..., k}. (Note that it is not sufficient to consider only the last
statement, as a participant could encode O2 = Ax2E and O3 = Ax3E−1 instead
of O2 = Ax2 and O3 = Ax3 . In the multiplication O2O3..., the factors E and E−1
would cancel, and the statement would hold. It is therefore necessary to consider
each statement for j ∈ {2, ..., k}.)
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Fig. 4.1. Collision resolution in SICTA. Only a message involved in a collision in round
j may be retransmitted either in round 2j. The round 2j+1 is virtual; no transmission
takes place. No new message may be sent until all collisions are resolved.
Verification of Standard SICTA with a MST of 0.693
We now show how the techniques from the previous section can be used by
the participants to prove that they correctly executed the collision resolution
algorithm, without revealing if they are sending a message or not (so that the
senders of the messages remain anonymous).
Correct participation in the standard SICTA algorithm means that a partic-
ipant may only retransmit a message in round 2j if he already transmitted that
message in round j. Remember that SICTA operates in blocking mode an that
no new message may be sent until the resolution has finished. This principle,
which is illustrated in Figure 4.1, means that
– if a participant transmits Oj = Axj in round j, then he must transmit O2j =
Ax2j in round 2j; and
– if a participant transmits Oj = AxjM in round j, then he must transmit
either O2j = Ax2j or O2j = Ax2jM in round 2j.
(Note that sending no message equals to sending M = 1. If the participant
did not send a message in round j, this means that Oj = Axj · 1. The partici-
pant then has the ’choice’ between retransmitting O2j = Ax2j or O2j = Ax2j ·1
in round 2j. I.e., he is forced to retransmit O2j = Ax2j · 1 = Ax2j and may not
send a message.)
Using the techniques from the previous section, each participant can prove
that his ciphertext O2j is correct, without revealing if whether it contains a
message or not. To do this, the participant generates a zero-knowledge proof
that proves that(
logAj/A2j (Oj/O2j) = logg y
)
∨
(
logA2j (O2j) = logg y
)
(4.1)
holds. With this proof he can convince a verifier that he participated correctly,
without compromising the anonymity of the protocol.
As described before, SICTA is a recursive algorithm and there are virtual
rounds during which Cj is inferred, but no corresponding Oj is transmitted. It is
then not possible to prove statement (4.1), but luckily it is still possible to prove
that O2j is correct. To do this, the participant proves that a message contained
in the nearest transmitted parent round was transmitted at most once in all the
branches down to O2j . Akin to Example 2, a participant proves that(
logAjt/2/Aj1 ...Ajt
(Ojt/2/Oj1 ...Ojt)= logg y
)
∨
(
logA2j (O2j)= logg y
)
holds, wherein j1 := 2j, jk := (jk−1/2) − 1 and t such that jt/2 is the index of
the nearest transmitted parent round of round j.
Example 3. In the collision resolution process shown in Figure 3.1, each partic-
ipant shows for O2 that(
logA1/A2(O1/O2) = logg y
)
∨ (logA2(O2) = logg y)
holds, then for O4 that(
logA2/A4(O2/O4) = logg y
)
∨ (logA4(O4) = logg y)
holds, then for O6 that(
logA1/A2A6(O1/O2O6) = logg y
)
∨ (logA6(O6) = logg y)
holds, then for O14 that(
logA1/A2A6A14(O1/O2O6O14) = logg y
)
∨ (logA14(O14) = logg y)
holds.
So we have shown that a participant can prove in zero-knowledge that he
properly participates in the standard SICTA collision resolution algorithm. Any
participant who is not able to prove that his output is correct can be excluded
from the group. The corresponding round is lost and must be repeated by the
remaining participants.
Additional Verification for Optimized SICTA with a MST of 0.924
The special technique we described in section to increase the MST from 0.693
to 0.924 uses a deterministic rule for the retransmission after a collision of two
messages. E.g. only the message with the lower value must be retransmitted. So
we need additional verification to detect participants that do not respect this
rule. We cannot verify this with a single zero-knowledge proof, but we can for
instance use the following approach.
If one of the two participants involved in the collision does not respect this
rule, the other one can switch back to random retransmission in order to split
the collision. Once the collision has been split and the two messages are out,
everybody sees that there must have been a problem in a previous round, and
an investigation can be started. The message M of the cheating participant is
now known, and every participant must then for instance send a zero-knowledge
proof that he did not send this message during the initial collision round (i.e.
prove that logA1 O1/M 6= logg y). The disruptor will not be able to come up
with an appropriate proof and can be eliminated from the group.
Further Minor Security Considerations
Malicious participants may attempt to delay the collision resolution process or
to prevent it from terminating. For instance,
– colluding participants can always chose the same round to retransmit their
messages, or
– a malicious participant can wait until all other participants have transmitted
and then choose to retransmit his message so that a collision occurs, or
– a malicious participant may not send a valid message in the first place.
However, such malicious behavior is easy to detect. In the previously described
SICTA algorithm with a MST of 0.924, the probability that a collision does not
split is less than or equal to 1/4 (it is exactly 1/4 for collisions with 3 messages).
Thus, the probability that a collision does not split k times in a row is less than
or equal to 1/4k. E.g., the probability that a collision does not split 5 times in
a row is below 0.1%. When such malicious activity is detected, one can require
commitment before transmission and one can use zero-knowledge proofs similar
to the ones proposed in [10] to detect participants that are frequently involved
in non-splitting collisions. If a lower throughput is acceptable, one can go for a
simpler approach and just skip the branches of the resolution tree that do not
split after several attempts, without trying to detect the malicious participants.
5 Related Work
Superposed receiving [12,13] is a collision resolution technique for the dining
cryptographers protocol that achieves throughput of 100%. Therein, messages
are elements of an additive group. When a collision occurs, the average of the
messages values is computed and only messages whose value is less than this
average are retransmitted. Like in SICTA, inference cancellation is used, which
leads to the 100% throughput. However, this approach requires the use of an ad-
ditive finite group and it cannot be implemented using the algebraic ciphertexts
that we need for efficient ciphertexts generation and for zero-knowledge proofs.
A fully verifiable dining cryptographers protocol was proposed in [8] and
rediscovered in [5]. In this protocol, we have 100% throughput. However, there is
the need for a reservation phase which can be lengthy and cumbersome. Current
systems are using mixnets to perform the reservations and therefore they are
inefficient when only a few reservations are made. Further, they do not easily
adapt to situations where participants join or leave frequently.
6 Applications
Our protocol can be used to implement computationally secure anonymous com-
munication channels with a low latency. Another application is the realization of
secret shuffle algorithms (e.g. [11]). A secret shuffle algorithm is used to obtain
a shuffled list of values from a plurality of participants, while keeping it secret
which value is coming from which participant. Existing solutions typically re-
quire each participant to submit a value. The protocol proposed herein also works
efficiently if only a few participants have a value to submit. In particular it may
be used to shuffle anonymous public keys for verifiable dining cryptographers
protocols in which rounds are reserved [8,5].
7 Concluding Remarks
The main problems of the dining cryptographers protocol are collisions and
malicious participants disrupting the communication.
We have shown that with a collision resolution algorithm it is possible to
achieve a maximum stable throughput of up to 0.924 messages per round. Fur-
ther, we have shown that if we use ciphertexts with an algebraic structure as
proposed in [10], we can verify in zero-knowledge that each participant properly
retransmits his message during the collision resolution process.
Compared to other dining cryptographer protocols, our approach does not
need a reservation phase to avoid collisions. It is therefore easier to implement
and it adapts more naturally to situations where participants are frequently
joining and leaving the group.
We see possible applications in the fields of low-latency anonymous commu-
nication and secret shuffling.
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